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 ABSTRACT 
This paper first establishes the importance of the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) as a subsidy for the production of affordable housing in the United States, and 
then examines LIHTC allocation patterns in North Carolina in an attempt to determine 
possible biases in the production process.  Analysis of allocation data shows a strong 
correlation between the presence of commercial bank branches and LIHTC allocation 
patterns on a county-by-county basis, even after controlling for population. 
 
Through a detailed analysis of allocation patterns and interviews with key informants in 
the LIHTC industry, three possible biases are suggested.  First, LIHTC developers and 
properties may be spatially correlated due to time and cost savings as well as a need for 
specialized knowledge and local relationships.  Second, the financial involvement of 
local government may be an important factor in development decisions both as a result of 
state finance agency regulations and implications for financial feasibility.  Finally, 
decisions made by LIHTC investors may be playing a role in location decisions, although 
the extent of this role can be debated. 
 
 
 2
The production of affordable housing through the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit 
(LIHTC) program is neither perfectly efficient nor of sufficient scope to completely solve 
housing affordability problems in the United States.  However, affordable housing 
advocates should be aware of the significant victory that the program represents for those 
in need of housing assistance given the climate that social programs have faced both 
before and since the creation of the LIHTC in 1986.  The combination of an ever-
worsening budgetary climate, a continued emphasis on devolution with respect to social 
programs formerly sponsored by the Federal government, and the shift from the provision 
of multifamily housing assistance to homeownership assistance by the U.S. Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) represent a very real threat to the survival of 
the LIHTC.  Affordable housing advocates would be well advised to protect and 
maximize the efficient use of resources that are currently available from the Federal 
government until a political climate that allows for the expansion of social programs 
arises once again. 
 
This paper examines issues surrounding the operation and survival of the LIHTC in two 
parts.  First, the political climate surrounding affordable housing policy over the past four 
decades is examined, with a goal of establishing the improbability of the creation of the 
LIHTC as well as an argument for its importance to current affordable housing provision 
in the United States; and second, allocation patterns of the LIHTC in North Carolina are 
examined, with an eye on identifying potential program weaknesses that may need to be 
remedied to promote program efficiency, equity, and survival. 
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What is the Low-Income Housing Tax Credit, and where does it fit in current US 
affordable housing policy? 
Created as a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, primarily in response to changes in real 
estate tax law that gutted incentives for the production of affordable housing, the LIHTC 
provides a means of generating equity and reducing debt service for developers who 
agree to maintain affordability standards in housing that they build.1  The credit is 
distributed to states in a manner similar to a block grant by the U.S. Department of the 
Treasury, where final authority rests in the creation of guidelines for its use.  Each state 
currently receives $1.75 of credit per capita.  However, allocating authority and 
compliance duties lie with state allocating agencies, which tend to be quasi-public, self-
supporting organizations.2   
 
The LIHTC provides a 90 percent credit to its recipient over a ten-year period; in 
conjunction with tax benefits generated by depreciation, the LIHTC allows investors to 
realize a reasonable return without relying on cash flow generated by LIHTC properties.  
This allows developers to feasibly suppress rents to affordable levels.   
 
The regulations set by the U.S. Department of the Treasury governing this program 
require that, at a minimum, units constructed using the LIHTC serve tenants earning no 
greater than 60 percent of Area Median Income (AMI) as determined by HUD; some 
state allocating agencies, such as the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency (NCHFA) 
have outlined more stringent and detailed income requirements.  Treasury requirements 
                                                 
1 Case, Karl E. (1991).  “Investors, Developers, and Supply-Side Subsidies: How Much is Enough?  
Housing Policy Debate 2(2), 341-356. 
2 Orlebeke, Charles J. (2000).  “The Evolution of Low-Income Housing Policy, 1949 to 1999.”  Housing 
Policy Debate 11(2), 489-520. 
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basically require that LIHTC developments meet these requirements for a period of 30 
years, although a provision allowing for exit from the program after 15 years does exist.  
Again, NCHFA regulations are more strict than Treasury guidelines, and do not allow for 
such early exits.3,4 
 
Because the vast majority of developers of multifamily affordable housing neither have 
the cash flow needed to generate the proper amount of equity for the construction of 
LIHTC properties nor the need for the amount of tax credits awarded for construction, 
and non-profit developers cannot use tax credits because they do not pay taxes, equity is 
most frequently generated for these developments through the syndication process.  
Syndication usually involves a series of limited partnerships that utilize a third party 
through which credits and depreciation benefits are transferred to investors and equity is 
transferred to the developer of a LIHTC property.  Because of a need for large amounts 
of tax shelter as well as investment requirements contained in the Community 
Reinvestment Act of 1977, commercial banks comprise a large share of LIHTC investors; 
Federal quasi-public mortgage agencies such as the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (Freddie 
Mac) are also among the credit’s largest consumers.5,6 
 
                                                 
3 McClure, Kirk (2000).  “The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit as an Aid to Housing Finance: How Well 
has it Worked?”  Housing Policy Debate 11(1), 91-114 
4 North Carolina Housing Finance Agency (2003).  “2003 Qualified Allocation Plan.”  Online: 
http://www.nchfa.org/Rental_Home/2003_QAP.htm 
5 http://www.fanniemae.com/multifamily/understanding/index.jhtml?p=Multifamily&s= 
Understanding+Multifamily 
6 Newcomer, Chuck (2003).  Personal interview.  April 11, 2003. 
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Increasingly, Federal affordable housing policy has moved in the direction of 
encouraging lower-income Americans to purchase homes rather than seek rental 
housing.7  However, there are still a number of Federal programs aimed at assisting 
lower-income renters.  Charles Orlebeke proposed that Federal rental assistance is 
comprised of a three-pronged approach, including tenant-based vouchers under the 
Section 8 program; Federally-provided and locally-administered block grants such as the 
Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) and HOME Investment Partnerships 
Program; and the LIHTC.8   
 
While the first two legs of Federal strategy remain important, the argument can be made 
that the LIHTC is currently the most vital of the three.  In the face of tremendous waiting 
lists for tenant-based vouchers, the Section 8 program remains vastly underfunded;9 
additionally, while most believe housing block grants to be relatively safe from the 
Congressional budgetary axe, the recent move to eliminate the HOPE VI program 
demonstrates that in the current financial climate, any program is a potential target.10  In 
contrast, as will be demonstrated below, the LIHTC has not only seen its funding 
expanded and permanently authorized as a result of the Community Renewal Tax Relief 
Act of 2000,11 but has gathered a large amount of institutional momentum that has put it 
in a strong position to survive. 
 
                                                 
7 Knutson, Lawrence L. (2001).  “Bush Promotes Home Ownership Programs.”  North County (CA) Times, 
June 10, 2001. 
8 Orlebeke, ibid. 
9 Johnson, Amy (2003).  “A $50,000 House?  Hah!”  Virginia Gazette, March 5, 2003. 
10 Begos, Kevin (2003).  “HOPE VI Program is Successful, Needs Saving, Watt Says.”  Winston-Salem 
Journal, March 12, 2003. 
11 Complete text of the Act is available online at http://www.house.gov/kanjorski/statlang.htm 
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Affordable housing policy prior to 1986: the move to and back away from 
production 
 
While Federal housing policy dates to the New Deal era, with the groundwork for the 
government’s commitment to affordable housing laid down in the Housing Act of 1949 
that promised “a decent home and suitable living environment for every American 
family,” the Federal government did not truly embrace the role of housing provider until 
the creation of HUD in 1965 and the Housing Act of 1968.12  The Federal government 
approach to solving affordable housing problems in the 1960s was to enact sweeping 
production programs; most notable among these were the Section 235 and Section 236 
programs that provided subsidized mortgages to developers of both single-family and 
multifamily housing, with a goal of providing six million new subsidized units by 1978.13  
While these programs were fully funded and did rather rapidly stimulate the production 
of affordable housing – by 1970, the number of subsidized units under construction 
exceeded 400,000, a more than tenfold increase from the decade before14 – the role of the 
Federal government as a generous provider of supply-side housing subsidies did not last 
very long.   
 
In 1971, the President’s Third Annual Report on National Housing Goals raised concerns 
about these programs on a number of grounds.  First, because of a structure that relied on 
long-term debt, the cost of these programs was moderate in the programs’ early stages, 
but would grow at an alarming rate as the number of subsidized properties increased.  
Federal obligations were projected to be as high as $200 billion by the time payments 
                                                 
12 Orlebeke, ibid. 
13 Schussheim, Morton J. (1969).  Toward a New Housing Policy: The Legacy of the Sixties.  New York: 
Committee For Economic Development. 
14 Orlebeke, ibid. 
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were completed.  Second, problems of abandonment and urban decline were cited; these 
problems were largely fueled by suburban flight, though the concentration of subsidized 
housing in urban areas presumably contributed to them as well.  Finally, the point was 
made that even if the goal of producing six million new subsidized units were met, less 
than one quarter of families then qualifying for subsidized housing would find housing 
under these programs.15 
 
In response to these concerns and rapidly dwindling support for these programs, the 
Nixon administration placed a moratorium on funding for these programs in early 1973.  
While Section 235 and 236 properties were still built until mid-1974, the stream of 
Federal funding for the production of affordable housing was essentially cut off and 
would be radically restructured over the next decade and a half. 16 
 
Setting the stage for the role of the LIHTC as the dominant production program 
While the period between the Nixon administration moratorium in 1973 and the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 did not see a complete cessation of production subsidies for 
affordable housing, there was a marked shift in emphasis on the Federal level from 
supply-side subsidies to demand-side subsidies.17  Tenant-based assistance in the form of 
vouchers was first introduced in a very limited form under the Section 23 program in 
1965; however, it was not until the Section 8 program was created in 1974 that such 
assistance became a major portion of the affordable housing landscape.18   
                                                 
15 Orlebeke, ibid. 
16 Orlebeke, ibid. 
17 Orlebeke, ibid. 
18 Case, ibid. 
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 The first years of Section 8 saw an emphasis on what was then called the “Existing 
Housing” component of the program that provided housing allowances to qualifying 
lower-income tenants.  Still, the “New Construction” and “Substantial Rehabilitation” 
components of Section 8 quickly became the dominant uses of program funding, and 
remained a large source of affordable housing supply during the Carter administration.  
However, in 1982, the same set of problems that had led to the demise of the Section 235 
and 236 programs did in project-based Section 8 funding; citing the high cost of a 
growing number of Section 8 contracts as well as the absence of need for production 
programs given the developer-friendly tax code of the time, Congress rolled nearly the 
entirety of Section 8 funding into tenant-based vouchers.  Now bearing the label of 
“Housing Choice Vouchers,” the program remains a major component of the national 
affordable housing strategy.19   
 
Despite the lack of direct supply-side subsidies for affordable housing after 1982 – little 
more than the ability of state and local authorities to issue tax-exempt housing bonds 
existed after Section 8 moved away from production subsidies – the real estate tax code 
encouraged the production of multifamily housing in particular, with special provisions 
providing additional benefits to the owners of low-income housing.  As estimated by Karl 
Case, developers could pass benefits equal to approximately 15 percent of a project’s 
costs to a limited partner through depreciation alone.  Statistics showing the number of 
multifamily housing starts for this period support these claims, with an increase of 29 
                                                 
19 Case, ibid.; Orlebeke, ibid. 
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percent shown for the period spanning 1983-1986 over what had been recorded from 
1976-1979.20   
 
How the Tax Reform A t of 1986 – and the LIHTC – came to be c
                                                
Considered to be the most radical tax reform legislation since the New Deal era, the Tax 
Reform Act of 1986 (TRA 86) radically changed the landscape of the real estate tax code 
and allowed for the re-emergence of supply-side affordable housing subsidies through the 
creation of the LIHTC.   
 
An unlikely coalition supported TRA 86, led by President Reagan, who was eager to 
provide yet another large income tax cut to his constituents after having slashed the 
marginal Federal income tax rate for the uppermost bracket from 70 to 50 percent under 
the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981.21  This support came even at the risk of closing 
some of the more lucrative loopholes available to his party’s strongest backers, including 
those embedded in the real estate tax code.  Joining Reagan from the right was a group of 
free-market Republicans, led by Jack Kemp, trying to advance an agenda that would 
ostensibly advance economic efficiency by eliminating distortions created by loopholes 
while inducing investment through tax cuts; from the left, many Democrats in Congress 
joined the reform bandwagon, largely because they feared being left out of the spotlight 
 
20 Case, ibid. 
21 Case, ibid.; Conlan, Timothy J., Margaret T. Wrightson, and David R. Beam (1990).  Taxing Choices: 
The Politics of Tax Reform.  Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. 
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sure to be enjoyed by successful reformers, but also because TRA 86 proposed a dramatic 
hike in the corporate tax rate to replace revenues lost by cuts in income taxes.22 
 
This broad coalition that supported TRA 86 was not only the key to its enactment, but 
also is thought by some to be the reason why such a broad series of reforms were made 
despite the fact that no single provision contained in the legislation was thought to have 
the political support for passage.23  The need for such a coalition was also a key to the 
inclusion of the LIHTC in the legislation; in the context of Reagan-era bellicosity 
towards social program funding in general and affordable housing specifically, the fact 
that billions of dollars in annual tax expenditures were devoted to the program can be 
considered a significant victory for affordable housing advocates.24 
 
While some legislators who ultimately supported TRA 86 would ordinarily have fought 
against the inclusion of the LIHTC, a case can be made that a fairly broad coalition had 
good reason to stump for its creation.  Most obviously, urban Democrats, primarily from 
the northeast part of the country, were eager to protect affordable housing programs that 
had traditionally brought Federal dollars to their districts.25  Making matters worse for 
this group was the fact that the budget that Reagan had proposed for 1987 had both 
eliminated funding for the Section 202 program, which had funded housing for special 
needs populations, as well as for the Section 515 program administered through the 
                                                 
22 Birnbaum, Jeffrey H. (1987).  Showdown at Gucci Gulch: Lawmakers, Lobbyists, and the Unlikely 
Triumph of Tax Reform.  New York: Vintage. 
23 Birnbaum, ibid. 
24 Orlebeke, ibid.; Stegman, Michael A. (1991).  “The Excessive Costs of Creative Finance: Growing 
Inefficiencies in the Production of Low-Income Housing.”  Housing Policy Debate 2(2), 357-374. 
25 Case, ibid. 
 11
Farmers Home Administration that provided low-cost loans for affordable housing in 
rural areas; the previously urban-focused HUD was to be forced to share its housing 
budget with rural areas to make up the difference.26  As a result of the latter development, 
backers of the LIHTC were probably able to draw greater support from members of 
Congress representing low-income rural areas than had affordable housing legislation that 
flowed through HUD. 
 
Meanwhile, Republican support was encouraged by the design of the LIHTC program, 
which appeals to the New Federalist spirit that has dominated politics on the Federal level 
for the past two decades, through the devolution of program control from HUD to state 
allocating agencies.27  Additionally, the wave of scandals endured by HUD in the late 
1980s and early 1990s had just started to surface by the time TRA 86 was proposed; to 
the Reagan administration, which had already displayed a pugnacious attitude towards 
HUD through budget decisions, giving HUD as little Federal-level control over the 
program as possible must have been appealing.28 
 
Finally, support for the LIHTC came from outside of Congress as well.  With reform in 
the real estate portion of the Federal tax code, incentives for the production of affordable 
housing through depreciation fell through the floor, dropping from roughly 15 percent of 
project cost to just under 2 percent.29  This was not only bad news for affordable housing 
advocates, but also to the construction and real estate industry at large; absorbing an 
                                                 
26 Stegman (1991), ibid. 
27 Orlebeke, ibid. 
28 Welfeld, Irving (1992).  HUD Scandals: Howling Headlines and Silent Fiascoes.  New Brunswick, NJ: 
Transaction. 
29 Case, ibid. 
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inevitable decline in real estate investment was to be difficult enough, but for developers 
who had learned to take advantage of Federal funding from programs such as Section 236 
and the production side of Section 8, a new source of funding was essential.30   
 
In the end, TRA 86 passed by a comfortable margin; despite its importance, a procedural 
error allowed passage without a roll call vote, which leaves us unable to discern precisely 
which members of Congress stood behind the legislation when the dust had settled.31  
Regardless, this piece of legislation – both through its effect on tax benefits to real estate 
investors as well as through the creation of the LIHTC – has shaped the production of 
affordable housing for the past 17 years. 
 
The evolution of the LIHTC and its supporting institutions that have led to its 
survival 
 
Originally, the LIHTC was scheduled to sunset after three years, which required 
Congress to reauthorize the program.  Starting in 1989, Congress did extend the program, 
though only for one year at a time.  While this may have harmed the program’s ability to 
attract investors due to uncertainty surrounding its survival, it did allow Congress to 
repair elements of the program that had been problematic byproducts of its last-minute, 
ad hoc creation, such as the oversubsidy of developments and the relatively short time 
(15 years) originally required for LIHTC properties to remain in compliance with income 
standards.32 
 
                                                 
30 Orlebeke, ibid.; Stegman (1991), ibid. 
31 Birnbaum, ibid. 
32 McClure, ibid. 
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The turning point for the LIHTC came in 1993, when the program was permanently 
reauthorized by a still-Democratic Congress with support from the free-market Clinton 
administration.  With program continuity essentially ensured, the intermediaries and 
developers that would become the backbone of the LIHTC development industry aided 
the drive to make the program more efficient; in conjunction with improvements made by 
state allocation agencies in setting regulations and standards, this has cut the cost of 
securing equity from investors from roughly 50 to 25 cents on every dollar.33 
 
Again, it is important to note that the LIHTC has not only survived a period of budgetary 
contraction that was particularly harsh towards social programs, but is now permanently 
authorized and actually received a 40 percent increase in per capita funding under the 
Community Revitalization Tax Act of 2000.34  We cannot underestimate the importance 
of the institutions that have grown up in response to this legislation as a primary reason 
for its success. 
 
The range of groups that now comprise the coalition supporting the LIHTC is diverse and 
powerful.  Included are state and local governments, which have simultaneously been 
thrust into increasingly tight budgetary environments and saddled with a greater share of 
the funding burden for the provision of services and infrastructure.  As problems of 
housing affordability persist, state legislators will remain eager to protect any stream of 
Federal funding aimed at addressing this problem. 
                                                 
33 McClure, ibid.; Stegman, Michael A. (1999).  “Comment on Jean L. Cummings and Denise DiPasquale’s 
‘The Low-Income Housing Tax Credit: An Analysis of the First Ten Years’: Lifting the Veil of Ignorance.”  
Housing Policy Debate 10(2): 321-332. 
34 Stegman (1991), ibid.; Patashnik, Eric (2000).  Putting Trust in the U.S. Budget.  New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
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 In addition to political actors, a powerful group of for-profit and nominally non-profit 
business interests have evolved to take advantage of this source of funding.  First, there is 
evidence from research on the LIHTC that the majority of properties produced under this 
program are developed by contractors that deal specifically with equity derived from the 
sale of credits.35  In addition, a relatively small number of syndicators, including national 
players such as the Enterprise Social Investment Corporation and the Local Initiatives 
Support Corporation, as well as regional or local syndicators such as the Community 
Affordable Housing Equity Corporation, based in North Carolina, have come to depend 
on income generated from the syndication of the LIHTC.36  These organizations can 
exploit specialized knowledge, as well as relationships with state allocating authorities 
and large institutional investors, such as the banks that rely on LIHTC deals to satisfy 
requirements under the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, to best make use of the 
program.  Evidence of the power of this group of organizations can be taken from the 
amount of influence they hold with the Department of the Treasury; during the process of 
setting regulations for the New Markets Tax Credit (NMTC), the commercial cousin of 
the LIHTC, many of these same groups submitted suggestions that were eventually 
adopted in the NMTC Treasury regulations.37 
 
The presence of this coalition, in addition to the continuing harsh budgetary environment 
expected to face social programs into the foreseeable future, has led many housing 
                                                 
35 McClure, ibid. 
36 Orlebeke, ibid.; Cummings, Jean L., and Denise DiPasquale (1999).  “The Low-Income Housing Tax 
Credit: An Analysis of the First Ten Years.”  Housing Policy Debate 10(2): 251-307. 
37 Kiddoo, David (2003).  Regulatory Challenges to the New Markets Tax Credit and New Markets Venture 
Capital Programs.  Unpublished manuscript. 
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advocates to suggest that the LIHTC is the future of the production of affordable 
housing.38  I would like to agree, and suggest that not only do I believe that other 
affordable housing production programs will not garner Federal funding in the near 
future, but also that the LIHTC will continue to be a well-supported program. 
 
Does reliance on the p ivate sector leave policymakers with too little control over 
the location of LIHTC properties? 
r
                                                
 
Due to the administrative structure of the LIHTC – state allocating agencies evaluate 
individual projects on criteria largely related to financial feasibility39 – policymakers 
retain a relatively small amount of control with respect to the location of LIHTC 
properties.40  Policies governing allocation decisions are a part of the Qualified 
Allocation Plans that these allocating agencies draw up, with “set-asides” ensuring that a 
portion of credits are used for developments that meet criteria related to the geographic 
location of a property, the for-profit or non-profit status of the developer, and the income 
level of the county or census tract in which a property is located.  However, the presence 
of these set-asides may not guarantee that a large amount of control over the distribution 
of credits is retained by the government.   
 
Using a series of statistical analyses, the remainder of this paper examines possible bias 
in the LIHTC program stemming from the reliance on the private sector for the 
production of affordable housing developments by posing the following research 
question: does the lack of access to the developers and investors who comprise the 
 
38 Stegman (1999), ibid.; Orlebeke, ibid. 
39 Shelburne, Mark (2003).  Personal interview.  April 10, 2003. 
40 Orlebeke, ibid. 
 16
specialized production infrastructure of LIHTC properties prevent some locations from 
receiving their fair share of affordable housing through this program? 
 
Due to data availability, the county level has been chosen as the geographical unit of 
analysis for this study.  Additionally, because of the role that commercial banks play in 
providing both equity and debt capital for LIHTC projects, the analyses used in this paper 
consider the number of commercial banks in a county as an appropriate proxy for the 
presence of the LIHTC infrastructure.   
 
 
Overview of the data 
 
LIHTC allocation data were taken from the North Carolina Housing Finance Agency 
database of LIHTC properties in North Carolina.  Federal and state credit amounts were 
aggregated by county and expressed as the sum of allocations for all projects.  While the 
NCHFA data indicated whether or not each project received Section 515 funding from 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the amount of Section 515 funding for each project 
was not indicated; therefore, the amount of Federal LIHTC allocations for projects using 
Section 515 funding was used as a proxy.  Credit amounts were calculated for the 
allocation cycles from 1986 to 2002. 
 
Data for the number of commercial bank branches by county was taken from the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and represent totals from June 2000.  County 
population levels and the number of housing units built 1995 and after were taken from 
the U.S. Bureau of the Census 2000 Summary File 3 (SF 3). 
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 After all the data were aggregated by county, the study comprised 100 data points (one 
for each county in North Carolina).  In these counties, 1716 LIHTC allocations were 
made between 1986 and 2002, with 247 projects also receiving Section 515 funding and 
81 receiving state credits. 
 
Discussion and presentation of the regression models 
 
Model 1 – the primary model in this analysis – uses Federal LIHTC allocations per capita 
as the dependent variable, with the number of commercial bank branches, the sum of 
Federal LIHTC allocations for projects receiving Section 515 funding, and the sum of 
state LIHTC allocations as dependent variables.  As is the case in all of these models, the 
county is the unit of analysis.   
 
In model 2, Federal and state allocations are added together and considered on a per 
capita basis as the dependent variable; by design, the state credit is intended to provide a 
disproportionately large benefit to lower-income counties,41 and may make projects in 
such locations relatively more attractive by reducing the amount of debt financing that 
may be needed for development of a LIHTC property.  The independent variables include 
the number of commercial bank branches and the sum of Federal LIHTC allocations for 
projects receiving Section 515 funding.  All relationships are expected to be positive.  
Model 3 transforms the dependent variable used in model 2 and subtracts allocations 
made for projects that received Section 515 funding.  This isolates projects that do not 
draw from this obvious source of Federal funding.  The number of commercial bank 
                                                 
41 NCHFA, ibid. 
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branches remains as the only independent variable, and the relationship between the 
variables is expected to be positive.42 
 
Overview of descriptive statistics 
 
The population of North Carolina is somewhat concentrated in a handful of counties – 
nine of the state’s 100 counties comprise 38 percent of the state’s population.43  Given the 
correlation between population and many of the most important variables in this analysis, 
it should not be surprising that many of the variables show descriptive statistics that 
indicate a “long right tail,” with a handful of data points well outside of the normal 
distribution and a standard deviation that exceeds the mean. 
 
Highlights include a mean of 22.9 commercial bank branches per county, with more than 
half of the counties in North Carolina having 13 or fewer branches, while 225 branches 
are located in Mecklenburg County alone.  The mean sum of Federal LIHTC allocations 
per county is $1,541,134.90, which far exceeds the standard deviation of 4,460,409.31.  
While the distribution of Federal LIHTC allocations per capita also possesses a long right 
tail, it is not as pronounced as that of the distribution of commercial banks by county.  
Descriptive statistics are summarized in Table 1 below.   
 
                                                 
42 Originally, the data for these models were divided using a dummy variable for the time periods of 1986-
1996 and 1997-2002; this split was meant to reflect LIHTC program refinements that had taken place both 
at the Federal and state levels.  However, this variable proved to be insignificant as an independent 
variable, and similar effects were noted when the same preliminary models were run for both groups of 
data.  As a result, data for all years was rolled into a single model.  This also had the effect of reducing the 
number of counties that did not receive any allocations to three.  The decision to transform allocation 
variables into per capita figures was made in response to an obvious and highly significant correlation 
between those variables, as well as the number of commercial bank branches per county, and population.  
By using per capita figures in the dependent variables, the possibility of colinearity has been reduced. 
43 These are all the counties in North Carolina with a population in excess of 150,000, and include 
Buncombe, Cumberland, Durham, Forsyth, Guilford, Mecklenburg, New Hanover, Onslow and Wake. 
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Table 1.  Descriptive statistics. 
 
n = 100 Mean Min Max SD 
Number of commercial bank branches per 
county 22.90 1 225 33.50 
Number of commercial bank branches per 
capita per county .000291 .000085 .000687 .000095 
Sum of Federal LIHTC allocations per 
county $1,541,134.90 $0 $39,221,914 4,460,409.31 
Sum of Federal LIHTC allocations per capita 
per county $13.76 $0 $62.47 10.38 
Sum of state LIHTC allocations per county $91,134.32 $0 $1,014,516 152,147.73 
Sum of state LIHTC allocations per capita 
per county $1.46 $0 $9.14 2.28 
Sum of Federal LIHTC allocations to 
projects receiving Section 515 financing per 
county 
$148,399.99 $0 $1,049,957 195,157.70 
Sum of Federal LIHTC allocations to 
projects receiving Section 515 financing per 
capita per county 
$3.38 $0 $17.96 3.99 
 
 
 
Summary of the regression models 
 
The primary model used in this analysis is model 1.  Despite having only three 
independent variables, none of which has an obvious relationship to the dependent 
variable, the model has a strong adjusted r2 of .348, and also shows a highly significant F-
statistic of 17.072.  Additionally, among the independent variables, the number of 
commercial bank branches shows the strongest correlation at r = .430; this is significant 
at p < .005.  Even when an attempt to remove factors that may contribute to the strong 
correlation between the number of commercial bank branches and per capita LIHTC 
allocations is made in models 2 and 3, the F-statistics and correlations between the 
dependent variable and the number of commercial bank branches remains significant at 
the p < .005 level, with reduced but reasonably healthy adjusted r2 levels.  Table 2 below 
summarizes the key statistical aspects of all three models. 
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Table 2.  Summaries of the three regression models. 
 
 
n = 100 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Dependent variable 
Federal LIHTC 
allocations per capita 
per county 
Federal and state LIHTC 
allocations per capita 
per county 
Federal and state LIHTC 
allocations for projects 
not receiving Section 
515 funding per capita 
per county 
Coefficients: Independent variables (t-values in parentheses) 
Constant 5.956 (4.173)*** 7.940 (5.120)*** 8.195 (7.077)*** 
Commercial bank 
branches per county .163 (6.153)*** .161 (5.393)*** .159 (5.547)*** 
Federal LIHTC 
allocations for projects 
receiving Section 515 
funding per capita per 
county 
.760 (3.310)*** 1.062 (4.244)*** N/A 
State LIHTC allocations 
per capita per county 1.033 (2.652)** N/A N/A 
Correlations: Independent variables 
Commercial bank 
branches per county .430*** .382*** .489*** 
Federal LIHTC 
allocations for projects 
receiving Section 515 
funding per capita per 
county 
.215** .253** N/A 
State LIHTC allocations 
per capita per county .261*** N/A N/A 
Summary statistics 
R2 .348 .280 .239 
Adjusted R2 .328 .265 .231 
SEE 8.509 9.591 9.545 
F 17.072*** 18.850*** 30.771*** 
 
* indicates significance at p < .05; **indicates significance at p < .01; ***indicates significance at p < .005 
 
 21
Limitations of the regression models 
 
While the results suggested by the models above are encouraging, a number of caveats 
should be pointed out regarding their limitations.  First, the small number of independent 
variables – especially in models 2 and 3 – result in relatively low adjusted r2 levels.  As a 
result, this analysis may be missing a key variable that is more important than the number 
of commercial bank branches per county. 
 
Also, it should be noted that the use of grant funding and soft loans, most notably through 
the Rental Production Program administered through NCHFA but also including the 
Federally-sponsored HOME and CDBG programs, are not accounted for due to the 
unavailability of data.  These programs may make LIHTC developments easier to fund in 
typically disadvantaged areas; furthermore, if these funds are used as programmatic 
support for development in these areas, the LIHTC allocation numbers would be lower as 
a result of Federal regulations that subtract such grants from the eligible basis of a 
project.44  Similarly, access to soft money that is not deducted from the eligible basis of a 
project may both be connected to areas that are higher in population or have higher 
income levels, both of which are highly correlated with the number of commercial bank 
branches.  If that is true, then LIHTC properties in those areas would be more financially 
feasible, which in turn may skew allocation levels to be higher in counties with more 
commercial bank branches. 
 
Finally, while the state LIHTC has been used by NCHFA to support development in 
lower-income counties, it has typically been an ineffective tool for generating equity as it 
                                                 
44 McClure, ibid. 
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is useful only for investors having tax liability in North Carolina.  This year, the state 
credit has been changed to a format that essentially allows NCHFA to directly provide 
equity for LIHTC developments.  It remains to be seen whether or not this policy change 
affects the distribution of LIHTC allocations. 
 
Alternative interpretations of correlations between allocations and the presence 
of commercial bank branches 
 
While this analysis has assumed that the number of commercial bank branches in a 
county can be used as a proxy for access to investors and developers that specialize in 
building LIHTC properties, it is possible that this variable represents a proxy for an 
entirely different factor in the allocation of the LIHTC. 
 
First, it is possible that the presence of commercial banks is related to the demand for 
housing in general and, by extension, the demand for affordable housing produced 
through the use of the LIHTC.  At first glance, the correlation between the number of 
commercial bank branches and the percentage of housing units built in 1995 and after – a 
proxy for housing demand – came up as significant, showing a correlation of r = .228, 
which is significant at the p < .05 level.  However, it is important to note that the 
percentage of housing units built in 1995 and after is also significantly correlated with 
population (r = .232); population, in turn, is extremely highly correlated with the number 
of commercial bank branches in a county (r = .984).  When population is controlled for 
by transforming the number of commercial bank branches into a per capita statistic, the 
correlation with the percentage of housing units built in 1995 and after not only becomes 
insignificant but also negative at r = -.175.  This finding casts doubt on the assertion that 
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the presence of commercial bank branches is indicative of high housing demand.  A 
complete list of these correlations is given below in Table 3. 
 
Table 3.  Correlations between variables associated with housing demand  
 
n = 100 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per county 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per capita 
per county 
Percentage 
of housing 
units built 
1995 and 
after per 
county 
Population 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per county 
N/A .064 .228* .984*** 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per capita 
per county 
.064 N/A -.175 -.045 
Percentage 
of housing 
units built 
1995 and 
after per 
county 
.228* -.175 N/A .232* 
Population .984*** -.045 .232* N/A 
 
* indicates significance at p < .05; **indicates significance at p < .01; ***indicates significance at p < .005 
 
 
Next, we can examine whether or not income is a factor in our findings.  Because higher 
rents can be charged for LIHTC units in higher-income counties, the theory can be 
advanced that LIHTC developments may be easier to develop in such locations.45  While 
the number of commercial bank branches in a county is strongly correlated with area 
                                                 
45 Shelburne, ibid. 
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median income, it is quite possible that this is an artifact of the correlation between 
income and population; income actually shows a negative correlation with the number of 
bank branches per capita per county.  Furthermore, income is not strongly correlated with 
per capita allocation amounts, which casts doubt on the theory that differences in income 
may be responsible for the results in the models presented in this paper.  A complete list 
of these correlations are given below in Table 4. 
 
Table 4.  Correlations between variables associated with income 
 
n = 100 
Area 
Median 
Income 
Federal 
LIHTC 
allocations 
per county 
per capita 
Federal and 
state LIHTC 
allocations 
per county 
per capita 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per county 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per capita 
per county 
Area 
Median 
Income 
N/A .074 .021 .477*** -.165 
Federal 
LIHTC 
allocations 
per county 
per capita 
.074 N/A .981*** .430*** .255* 
Federal and 
state LIHTC 
allocations 
per county 
per capita 
.021 .981*** N/A .382*** .242* 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per county 
.477*** .430*** .382*** N/A .064 
Commercial 
bank 
branches 
per capita 
per county 
-.165 .255* .242* .064 N/A 
* indicates significance at p < .05; **indicates significance at p < .01; ***indicates significance at p < .005 
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Why does the presence of commercial bank branches influence LIHTC allocations?  
An examination of counties that buck the t end r
                                                
 
With the link between commercial bank branches and LIHTC allocations established, a 
useful exercise may be to examine the counties that do not follow the expected pattern 
suggested by the regression models in this analysis.  Specifically, the 18 counties that 
have per capita Federal LIHTC allocation levels that are above the statewide median but 
per capita commercial bank branch numbers that are below the statewide median are of 
interest, and are discussed below.  These 18 counties can be placed into four groups: 
 
First, a group of counties in the eastern part of the state that include Columbus, Craven, 
Duplin, Edgecombe, Greene, Northampton, Pitt and Robeson, have been eligible for 
additional allocations as a result of efforts to assist areas damaged by Hurricane Floyd, 
and may show higher per capita allocation numbers as a result.   
 
Second, a group of these counties are either within an identified MSA or directly 
contiguous to a highly populous county; these include Buncombe, Cabarrus, Gaston, 
Iredell and Stokes, with Edgecombe and Pitt included from the list of counties above that 
are eligible for hurricane relief funds.  As a result to proximity to metropolitan areas, 
these counties may have greater access to the LIHTC development infrastructure than 
others.46 
 
 
46 In addition to the findings listed above, it is important to note that the three counties in which no LIHTC 
developments are located – Camden and Gates in the extreme northeast portion of the state, and Clay in the 
extreme west – are quite far removed from any metropolitan area. 
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Third, Vance and Warren counties show a greater percentage of housing units built in 
1995 or after than the state average.  Furthermore, they are classified as Tier 1 counties 
by the North Carolina Department of Commerce, which indicates that they are among the 
most economically distressed counties in the state.  The fact that Tier 1 counties show an 
even smaller percentage of housing units built 1995 and after than the state as a whole 
implies that they are unusually fast-growing counties.  Additionally, both are reasonably 
close to and connected by Interstate 85 to the Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill MSA, which 
may imply greater access to the LIHTC development infrastructure, as Wake and 
Durham counties rank first and fourth in total Federal LIHTC allocations, respectively. 
 
Fourth, Macon, Scotland and Yancey counties have no apparent link and cannot be 
categorized with any of the three groups above. 
 
Some thoughts from the LIHTC pros on location 
In order to address the above findings and better inform this analysis, a series of 
interviews with professionals in the North Carolina LIHTC industry was conducted.  
Interviewees included Mark Shelburne, Policy and Legal Affairs Officer at NCHFA; 
Charles R. “Chuck” Newcomer, the Vice President and Director of the Underwriting 
Group at the Community Affordable Housing Equity Corporation in Raleigh; and Murray 
F. Gould, President and Founder of Gould and Associates, a Raleigh-based development 
firm specializing in tax credit properties.  Notable findings from these interviews are 
listed below. 
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First and foremost, LIHTC property location is driven by the whims of the market.  All 
three interviewees indicated that the strength of the affordable housing market drives 
project feasibility and, therefore, location.  Gould noted: 
 
We really focus on the market – what’s the competition like, how is the supply of 
housing, what are the demographics like.  We can find a project that might look 
good in one of the coastal counties, but if there are only 10,000 people living in 
the county, we won’t be able to find anybody who wants to rent there.  We have 
to make sure we have enough customers before we do anything.47 
 
Shelburne also noted that market dynamics play an important role in the location of 
LIHTC properties; however, as the value of credits has increased in recent years, the 
range of locations in which financially feasible properties can be built has broadened. 
 
Location is really determined by the developers.  We have been able to steer 
location a little more in recent years; back when the price of credits was lower, 
it was very difficult to build a feasible property outside of high-income locations 
because the amount of bank debt was too high and that drove rents to be too 
high as well.48 
 
Developers, especially those working on a smaller scale, may have an incentive to pursue 
opportunities close to home.  Newcomer indicated that the combination of travel and 
specialized knowledge needed to develop a LIHTC property may narrow the geographic 
scope of operations for developers: 
 
Some of the smaller developers – especially nonprofit developers – will only 
develop in one state or a part of a state.  It has to be local unless you have a big 
organization, because developers have to physically spend time at a location to 
complete a project.  Development also requires a relationship with the state 
finance agency and knowledge of the regulations in the QAP.49 
 
                                                 
47 Gould, Murray F. (2003).  Personal Interview.  April 16, 2003. 
48 Shelburne, ibid. 
49 Newcomer, ibid. 
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While investors do make demands with respect to the location of LIHTC properties, they 
are generally broad in nature.  While Newcomer noted that the largest investors in the 
LIHTC market, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, generally do not make strong demands 
with respect to the location of properties, commercial banks looking to meet CRA 
requirements often look to invest in specific locations: 
 
Banks can be specific in terms of location.  Most of our larger investors are 
located statewide in North Carolina, but some have acquired smaller banks and 
have more regional interests.  If a smaller bank that has been acquired hasn’t 
done too well with the CRA, the investor may say, “We want something in 
county X.”  We’re starting to see that more and more.50 
 
Having an interested local government matters, as soft money improves both project 
feasibility and project scoring under the North Carolina QAP.  In addition to earlier 
comments regarding project feasibility in higher-income counties, Shelburne noted that 
the abnormally high rate of allocations seen in Wake County may also be a result of 
generous local government support through housing bonds and grants. 
 
A big difference in Wake County has been local government lending.  If you can 
get financing at one or two percent from a government source, projects become 
more feasible; we also give bonus points for local government funding.  Wake 
County and Raleigh have done a good job of supporting low-income housing in 
the past.51 
 
Finally, the point structure of the QAP does determine the pattern of development, if only 
to a small extent.  Before a developer can get a property through the syndication process 
and equity for construction can be obtained, an allocation of credits must be obtained; 
because of this fact, developers do sometimes chase points.  As Newcomer noted: 
                                                 
50 Newcomer, ibid. 
51 Shelburne, ibid. 
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Developers will chase points – if they didn’t, they would probably never venture 
out of the urban areas and into tobacco country.52 
 
Conclusion: developers, investors, and local governments all affect the location of 
properties, but to what extent? 
 
As a result of the findings of the models used in this paper as well as information gleaned 
from key informants, further analyses to address three issues may be warranted.  First, 
access to the LIHTC development community appears to be important.  LIHTC 
developers may be geographically concentrated; because of the need to spend time at 
LIHTC property sites as well as the benefits gained through having specialized 
knowledge and relationships with those making allocation decisions, developers may be 
reluctant to pursue opportunities in distant locations.  The question of how much 
proximity matters in location decisions has potential policy implications, as regulations 
set forth by state finance agencies may be able to ameliorate distributional failures.  This 
should be addressed in future research; given the availability of data, spatial correlations 
between developers and properties could easily be gauged. 
 
Second, the role of soft money from local government and nonprofit sources should not 
be overlooked as a possible factor in location decisions.  Considering that the LIHTC 
represents the latest step in the Federal devolution of affordable housing policy, a link 
between local government interest and the production of LIHTC units would not be 
surprising.  Detailed data may not be available on the amount of soft money used in the 
                                                 
52 Newcomer, ibid. 
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development of these properties; however, the policy implications of disparities in local 
funding should not be overlooked in future research efforts.  
 
Finally, while developers most probably have little difficulty finding debt capital for 
LIHTC properties, equity investment – specifically, from banks that are largely motivated 
by Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 regulations requiring equity investment in their 
service areas – may be directed towards those areas best served by commercial banks, 
which in turn may limit the sites selected for investment.  While there was dissent among 
key informants around the extent to which investors influence site selection, the 
syndicator in the group noted that his firm spent a significant amount of time chasing 
after developers that could deliver projects in areas desired by his firm’s investors.  This 
implies that the actions of investors may be important, and that they represent another 
area of future research. 
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